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Introduction
In recent years credit cards have pene-
trated the Turkish market, with circulation
growing to 44.4 million cards as of December
2009, a 182 percent increase over levels in
December 2002. (The Interbank Card Center)
As a result, Turkey stands as one of the fastest
growing credit card markets in Europe and in
2007 ranked third in terms of number of credit
cards and tenth in card usage. (Aysan and Yildiz,
p. 142)
Plastic was first introduced to Turkey in
1968 with the inception of Diners Club Cards,
which were seen solely as an element of pres-
tige that were distributed to the rich. Today,
credit card issuers offer multi-branded cards
with installment, use award, and loyalty-point
features. Point-of-sale machines, devices used
to swipe credit cards when making purchases,
are found in most stores around the country,
making plastic one of the most convenient
methods of payment.
Yet growth does not come without further
complexities and problems. Complaining cus-
tomers, rising levels of card defaults, shocking
statistics about card-debt-related suicides, and
increasing usage have drawn attention to the
industry in the past decade. Consequently, the
government has been compelled to intervene.
In 2003 credit cards were taken under the scope
of Turkey’s Consumer Protection Law, and an
amnesty was granted that marked the start of
a process of regulation and reform; however,
despite the increased regulation, difficulties still
remain.
In this article I first discuss the nature of
credit card processing in Turkey in order to give
background on the parties involved and their
respective interests. I then present the history
of the Turkish credit card market, including that
of industry regulation, and address two issues
pertaining to the Turkish credit card system: the
stickiness of credit card rates in recent years and
the rising number of defaults as a result of the
global financial crisis. In conclusion, I suggest
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that a cycle, fed by the two problems just men-
tioned, is affecting the Turkish market and
threatening the future of price competition.
The Nature of Credit Card Processing
in Turkey
Credit cards are a method of payment that
authorizes the holder to make purchases up
to a predetermined limit and pay later. Card-
issuing organizations, typically banks, pay retail-
ers at the time of purchase and send customers
a bill for the accumulated purchases over a
period of time. On the last payment date, the
final day on which cardholders are expected to
pay their debts, cardholders have the option of
paying the balance in full or making a minimum
payment.1 A contractual rate of interest is
applied on the residual balance after the mini-
mum payment is made each month. However,
the balance will be subject to delay interest, at
the higher default rate, if the payment is below
the minimum amount. Therefore, in addition
to serving as a method of payment, credit cards
provide a pool of credit.
In Turkey the body that holds the legal
responsibility for regulating the credit card
industry and overseeing procedural matters
related to information disclosures and licensure
is the Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BDDK) and its highest decision-mak-
ing body, the Board. At the same time, in regard
to transaction processing in Turkey, the Inter-
bank Card Center (BKM), founded in 1990, is
a partnership of public and private Turkish
banks that develops the rules and standards of
credit and debit cards in Turkey. (The Interbank
Card Center) The Interbank Card Center coor-
dinates the infrastructure that supports credit
card transaction processing and maintains the
efficiency of the domestic clearing and settle-
ment process. In addition, the Credit Bureau
of Turkey (KKB), founded in 1995, is a private
organization that monitors and gives access to
consumer credit information through its Credit
Referencing System (CRS). This information
enables banks to reduce the risk of consumer
portfolios and make well-informed credit deci-
sions. (Credit Bureau of Turkey)
In addition to being a convenient method
of payment and a vehicle for debt, many credit
cards in Turkey feature benefits such as loy-
alty points, frequent-flier miles, and installment
capabilities. Customers are quick to learn that
the more they spend on their cards, the greater
the rewards they earn. Yet in recent years what
seems to be an ideal and harmless form of
payment has been a one-way ticket down a path
of staggering credit card rates, default, and,
for some, suicide. However, it is important to
understand the roots of the credit card industry
in Turkey before delving into the issues that
remain today.
History of the Turkish Credit Card
Market
The credit card is a relatively new phenom-
enon in Turkey. In 1968 Turkish residents
were first introduced to Diners Club Cards.
Unlike the credit cards that are seen today, Din-
ers Club Cards required the holder to pay the
entire balance on the final payment date and did
not have a credit feature. Given only to the
rich as an element of prestige, Diners Club
Cards lacked the convenience of today’s credit
card. Many retailers lacked the machines needed
to process transactions, and the network of
establishments that accepted Diners Club Cards
was small. Thus, their usage was very limited in
Turkey.
As a result of increased tourism in Turkey
during the 1970s, American Express Cards
entered the market. Along with the Diners Club
Cards, these cards stood unrivaled until the
entrance of Eurocard, Mastercard, and Access
cards in 1975. (The Interbank Card Center) Over
the years, the credit card network continued
to develop with the entrance of Visa, the estab-
lishment of bonus-point reward systems, the
installation of the first point-of-sale terminal,
and the founding of the Interbank Card Cen-
ter (BKM) as discussed earlier. It was not until
after Turkey’s economic crisis in 2001 that the
credit card market began to flourish, and plas-
tic became one of the principal forms of pay-
ment. The number of credit cards almost tripled
between 2002 and 2008, and in terms of recent
growth the number of credit cards has increased
by about 17.5 percent from January 2008 to
November 2009. (The Interbank Card Center)
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1Referred to as the “minimum amount” in the Bank
Cards and Credit Cards Law of 2006.
This striking growth can partially be
attributed to the return of political and eco-
nomic stability to Turkey after the crisis.
Decreasing inflation and increasing economic
growth spurred the popularity of credit cards;
and, as government’s demand for funds
declined, banks shifted their focus to consumer
loans and saw credit cards as the easiest means
to build business. Due to high interest rates and,
prior to the global financial crisis, low default
rates, credit cards were a lucrative business
for card issuers. From a banking perspective, the
credit card business represents approximately
9.8 percent of loans made in the banking sector
and 29.4 percent of the loans made to con-
sumers. (Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency, pp. 26–29)
From the point of view of the consumer,
credit cards have become a major source of
credit for Turkish households. According to the
“Financial Stability Report” released by the Cen-
tral Bank of Turkey, credit card balances rep-
resent approximately 28 percent of household
liabilities as of March 2009. (p. 32) Especially in
times of economic difficulty, Turkish consumers
turn to credit cards to meet household expenses
when consumer loans are not readily available.
The growth of credit cards has been
accompanied by the simultaneous growth of
technology and point-of-sale systems around the
country, enabling cardholders to use plastic
almost everywhere. As of November 2009, the
BKM estimates that there are a total of 1.74 mil-
lion point-of-sale terminals around the country,
over three times the number of terminals that
existed at the end of 2002. (The Interbank
Card Center) At the same time, the “Financial
Stability Report” (p. 90) released by the Cen-
tral Bank of Turkey states that the volume of
credit card transactions rose by 17.6 percent
to 1,698 million Turkish lira (TL) and the
value increased by as much as 30.8 percent to
184,993 TL from 2007 to 2008.
In terms of market concentration, the
credit card industry is fairly concentrated,
with the top six issuers (out of a total of 22
issuers) controlling 87 percent of the market in
terms of outstanding balances and 80 percent
in terms of the number of customers. (Akin et
al., “Non-price..,” p. 8) Over the course of the
past decade, card issuers have taken advantage
of the expanding market. However, with growth
comes complexity. I will now discuss the process
of regulation that has accompanied the market’s
development.
The Process of Regulation and
Reform
As discussed earlier, prior to the capping
of credit card rates in 2006, credit cards in
Turkey were a high margin product, with
defaults low relative to those in Europe and
average credit card rates higher than four times
the cost of funds. (Aysan and Muslim, pp. 1–2)
After 2001, as the credit card market experi-
enced rapid growth, consumer complaints about
the excessive rates and card-debt-related deaths
and suicides drew increased attention to the
industry, galvanizing the government into
action. According to Mark Landler, a news
correspondent for the New York Times, “From
2003 to 2006, consumer groups said, 41 peo-
ple died because of credit card debt, either
through suicide or homicide. In one widely pub-
licized case, a 37-year-old policeman shot him-
self in the head on an Istanbul street after
friends tried to wrest the gun from him. He was
depressed over $40,000 in debts.” (Landler)
In response to such social unrest, the gov-
ernment first granted an amnesty to debtors
in 2003, and credit cards were taken under
the scope of the Consumer Protection Law. This
amnesty aimed to end credit card problems by
allowing qualified debtors to consolidate unpaid
debt into twelve monthly installments with a
maximum annual 50 percent interest rate to pay
off the balance. (Aysan and Yildiz, p. 146) How-
ever, the amnesty fell short of expectations as
very few debtors chose to apply. According to
Ahmet Faruk Aysan and Lerzan Yildiz,2 Ersin
Özince, chairman of the Banks Association of
Turkey, claimed that only 150,000 people applied
for the amnesty, when between 500,000 and 1
million people were expected to benefit. In addi-
tion, Abudurrahman Yildirim, an economist for
Sabah newspaper in Turkey, argues that many
debtors did not have the financial means to
pay back their debt even under the install-
ment plan offered by the government and that
other cardholders believed that another amnesty
would be granted again in the future. (Yildirim,
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2Economists at Bog˘aziçi University.
in Aysan and Yildiz, p. 146) Aysan and Yildiz
conclude that the amnesty of 2003 was a tem-
porary solution that would serve as a benchmark
for the amnesty of 2005.
However, the amnesty of 2005 also fell
short of expectations. The new amnesty, which
was issued along with the Bank Cards and Credit
Cards Law, benefited only those debtors who suf-
fered from high card rates and who had been
taken to court. This excluded individuals who
had outstanding balances but had neither
defaulted prior to January 2006 nor been taken
to court. Once again, the amnesty was criticized
for being a temporary solution. Of the nearly
one million people with card debts, roughly
25 percent took advantage. (Aysan and Yildiz,
p. 149)
Meanwhile, the Bank Cards and Credit
Cards Law went into effect in March 2006 and,
in contrast to the amnesties of 2003 and 2005,
was a comprehensive law that sought to address
a number of issues. This law had numerous pro-
visions that sought to address the exploitive
marketing tactics of issuers and to reduce the
number of card defaults. The law officially
gave the Central Bank of Turkey the sole author-
ity to determine maximum credit card inter-
est rates, and these would be announced every
3 months. In addition, issuers were no longer
able to distribute unsolicited cards, a minimum
payment percentage of 20 percent per period
was established, and new requirements were set
in regard to unauthorized increases in card
spending limits. These measures were taken
to deter banks from issuing cards to unworthy
customers and then locking them in at exor-
bitant rates. Even though certain provisions
of the law were questioned by consumer unions,
economists, and banks,3 the Bank Cards and
Credit Cards Law shored up aspects of the credit
card industry. For example, the non-performing
loan ratio for credit cards declined after the law’s
enforcement and continued to do so until Sep-
tember 2008. (Central Bank . . . , p. 66)
In terms of more recent legislation, in
June 2009 the Turkish parliament amended the
credit card law in order to bring financial relief
to debtors. Under the amendment, delinquent
cardholders were eligible to have their total
accrued interest (since the loan became non-
performing) recalculated. The newly established
debt balance could then be paid back under var-
ious installment plans lasting up to 36 months.
At the same time, this new legislation set new
minimum payment requirements. While the
original credit cards law passed in 2006 required
a 20 percent minimum payment percentage per
period, minimum payment percentages can now
be increased up to 30 percent or decreased to as
low as 10 percent subject to appropriate author-
ization from banking regulators. (O’Neill)
Still, despite the regulation, problems
remain, and the global economic crisis has
brought to the forefront weaknesses inherent
within the industry. I will next discuss the stick-
iness of credit card rates and the rising level
of card delinquencies in Turkey.
Sticky Credit Card Rates
The stickiness of credit card interest rates
in Turkey has been the subject of recent
research. As seen in Figure 1, credit card inter-
est rates remained at about the same level
from 2003 to 2007, while other credit rates in
Turkey generally declined over the same period.
In a study conducted at Bog˘aziçi University in
2008, Gulsun Akin and his colleagues concluded
that credit card rates are insensitive to down-
ward fluctuations in the cost of funds, as deter-
mined by the rates on overnight loans, due to
the lack of price competition in the credit card
market.4 The increase in the cost of funds dur-
ing Turkey’s economic crisis was quickly
reflected in credit card interest rates; however,
as the cost of funds declined in the market
thereafter, banks adjusted credit card rates by
a disproportionate amount. From 2003 to 2007,
overnight loan rates fell from 44 percent to
15.75 percent while weighted average credit
card rates declined to approximately 60 percent
in 2006, only to bounce back to roughly 80 per-
cent at the end of 2007. (Akin et al., “The Fail-
ure . . . ,” p. 2) At the same time, inflation
rates declined over the same period. Credit card
rates are directly related to overnight rates
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3The provisions that were questioned included the
minimum payment provision and the capping of interest
rates by the Central Bank of Turkey.
4Rates on overnight loans are used to determine
the cost of funds given the immediate liquidity often
demanded of banks on credit card obligations.
and inflation rates; therefore, one should expect
movements in the former to cause correspon-
ding movements in the latter. However, this did
not appear to be the case, and the interest rate
activity seen in the card market did not mir-
ror the behavior of rates in the consumer, home,
and auto loan markets.
Several theories have been proposed for
the downward inflexibility of credit card rates in
Turkey. In their 2006 examination of price com-
petition in the Turkish credit card market,
Ahmet Faruk Aysan and Nusret Ahmet Muslim5
state that convenience users and revolvers com-
prise 76 percent and 24 percent of the Turkish
market respectively. Convenience users pay all
of their bills on time and do not have any out-
standing balances after the final payment day.
In contrast, revolvers take advantage of the
credit feature on cards and pay the high rates of
interest on their debt.6 The high cost of accom-
modating convenience users is subsidized by the
profits generated from interest on revolvers.
Consequently, as Aysan and Muslim explain, a
“vicious cycle” occurs where higher credit
card rates lead to fewer revolvers and more con-
venience users; in turn, the higher costs asso-
ciated with convenience users push rates even
higher. (Aysan and Muslim, p. 9)
In reference to the U.S. card market in
the 1980s, Lawrence Ausubel, a professor at
the University of Maryland, argued that the con-
sumer characteristics of the market created a
disincentive for banks to lower rates. While
Ausubel studied the U.S. credit card market,
scholars in Turkey frequently reference his ideas
when discussing the Turkish situation. Accord-
ing to Ausubel, by lowering rates banks will only
attract the riskier revolvers whose demand is
sensitive to interest rate changes but will not
attract the convenience users who pay the entire
balance when due. (Ausubel) Therefore, the
demand of revolvers is price elastic while the
demand of convenience users is price inelastic.
Furthermore, due to the high level of non-
price competition in the Turkish credit card
market, card users face significant opportu-
nity costs if they choose to switch to a differ-
ent card issuer. The rapport that cardholders
develop with their respective banks is explored
37
Figure 1
Credit Card Interest Rates vs. Other Credit Interest Rates
in Turkey from 2003 to 2007
Source: Akin et al., “The Failure of Price Competition in the Turkish Credit Card Market,” p. 3.
5Economists at Bog˘aziçi University.
6These categorizations were previously made in the
work of Sujit Chakravorti, a senior economist at the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago, and Ted To, a research
economist at the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington,
D.C. The work is titled “A Theory of Credit Cards” and was
presented in May 2002 at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Innovation in Financial Services and Pay-
ments Conference.
in the research of Gulsun Akin and his col-
leagues at Bog˘aziçi University. Most cardhold-
ers in Turkey obtain cards from banks that
provide them with other financial services. In
a nationwide survey, cardholders indicated
that the primary criterion for selecting a credit
card was whether it was issued by the customer’s
primary bank. Non-price competition among
issuers ensues when issuers seek to differenti-
ate their cards through card level benefits and
bank level benefits.7 Akin and his colleagues
suggest that from 2002 to 2006 the level of non-
price competition in the Turkish market enabled
issuers to charge high rates based on various
bank quality and performance factors. Non-price
competition led to higher switching costs for
customers, and according to the study, cus-
tomers value banks that have a greater num-
ber of branches, a higher capital ratio, and a
larger market share. The level of credit card
rates was found to be statistically dependent
on these factors. (Akin et al., “Non-price . . .”)
Meanwhile, the development of co-
branded and multi-branded cards further
enhanced customer loyalty in the Turkish credit
card system. First introduced to Turkey in 1997,
co-branded cards are sponsored by two com-
panies, usually a retailer and a card-issuing
bank, and offer loyalty-point programs and spe-
cial deals to the companies’ joint customers. Co-
branding with airlines and soccer clubs is an
example of a tactic used by issuers to attract
consumers who favor a particular airline or soc-
cer team. While co-branded cards offer cus-
tomers great incentives and discounts, they also
require a customer to hold numerous cards in
order to take advantage of the loyalty-point pro-
grams at various retailers. As a result, the emer-
gence of multi-branded cards, cards that allow
customers to take part in loyalty-point programs
at a number of merchants all on one bank-
issued card, was welcomed by the market.
In summary, the evolution from store
cards to multi-branded cards has fueled non-
price competition in the market, with card
issuers looking to partner with popular retail-
ers and companies that consumers favor. Rather
than compete on the basis of price, card issuers
seek to provide greater rewards and spending
incentives than other issuers. These non-price
benefits in turn enable issuers to charge higher
rates and help account for the stickiness of rates
in the market.
In light of these circumstances, in 2006
the government granted the Turkish Central
Bank the authority to set maximum credit
card interest rates that would be announced
every three months. Yet the capping of rates
by the Central Bank has been met with much
opposition. Banks complain about declining
profits, and cardholders contend that rates are
still not low enough. Besides, issuers have
continued to set their rates at the ceiling level
(Akin et al., “The Failure . . . ,” p. 8), and many
parties in the Turkish card market are against
the imposed price ceilings. The question
remains, when will price competition arise in
the Turkish card market?
Analyzing Price-Based Competition
and Its Relationship to Market
Saturation
While studies have analyzed the stickiness
of credit card rates, perhaps the best way to
understand the lack of price competition in
the market is through a lens that measures
the level of market saturation. As previously dis-
cussed, credit card circulation in Turkey has
proliferated in the past decade. In general, entry
barriers often are relatively low during the
growth stage of an industry, and new entrants
can usually be absorbed without taking away
substantial market share from other competi-
tors. As a result, the intensity of rivalry is low,
and there is not a lot of price-based competition.
In 2008 the Celent Research Group
released a report entitled Turkish Credit Cards:
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Celent believes that the
market is slowly reaching its saturation point
and states in its report, “Consumer credit rarely
exceeds 10 percent of the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, or GDP, in domestic markets. . . . We expect
future growth in the credit market to be driven
by mortgages.” (Celent Research Group, in
“Limiting Card Interests . . .”) While it is clear
that the Turkish credit market continues to have
some growth opportunity, market growth will
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7Card level benefits include frequent-flier miles and
other spending-based incentives. Bank level benefits include
the bundling of credit cards and other services, as well as
the convenience associated with having a credit card at a
bank where an account already exists in the customer’s
name.
inevitably plateau, and the industry can be
expected to change. It is likely that banks will
then be forced to shift their focus from increas-
ing the number of credit cards outstanding to
nurturing relationships with their current card-
holders. Explosive growth cannot be maintained
indefinitely; therefore, rivalry between compa-
nies will start to intensify, and price-based com-
petition may ensue. Hence, it appears that solv-
ing the issue of credit card rates in Turkey
may simply be a matter of time. The ultimate
question remains, how long until the Turkish
market reaches saturation?
In order to determine how saturated the
market currently is, I first established an esti-
mate of the potential market for credit card
users. According to a press release by the Turk-
ish Statistical Institute, it was determined
that the number of employed persons in Turkey
reached 22.2 million in July 2009. (Turkish Sta-
tistical Institute) Given the fact that the gov-
ernment has been enacting stricter regulations
for the screening of card applicants, includ-
ing the verification of income, a reasonable esti-
mate of the number of potential card users is
the number of employed persons in Turkey.
In comparison, the number of current credit
card customers in the market reached 25.9 mil-
lion people in June 2009. (Banking Regula-
tion and Supervision Agency, p. 21) There-
fore, the number of current cardholders
exceeds my estimate of the potential market,
suggesting that the market is at or close to sat-
uration. These numbers suggest that the mar-
ket is reaching maturity and that the levels of
growth seen in the market over the past 10
years cannot be expected to continue into the
future. According to Tamer Sengun, a Bank-
ing Analyst in HSBC’s Securities division, “Fur-
ther growth will come from the favourable
demographics of Turkey — its young popula-
tion. However, one should note that the pop-
ulation with the highest spending power has
already been tapped.” (Sengun)
Therefore, as the market reaches its sat-
uration point, card issuers will likely look to
compete in new ways, such as on the basis of
price, in order to attract customers from other
competitors. However, the level of switching
costs in the Turkish card market is high, as
already noted. Thus, in order to encourage cus-
tomers to make a move, price-based incen-
tives will need to factor in these sizable oppor-
tunity costs.
The Rising Level of Credit Card
Delinquencies
According to figures released by the Turk-
ish Statistics Institute, the unemployment rate
in Turkey reached an all-time high of about
15.5 percent in January 2009. (Turkish Sta-
tistical Institute) While Turkish banks were
insulated from many of the effects of the global
economic crisis, the economy as a whole was
still affected as the decline in Turkish exports
forced more and more companies to lay off
workers.
In September 2009, the World Bank issued
a news release that summarized the results of
a survey of 2,100 households concerning the
effects of the economic crisis on the welfare of
Turkish families. The report stated that almost
three quarters of the families contacted have
experienced reductions in income between
October 2008 and June 2009. (The World Bank)
Consequently, it is no surprise that the level
of credit card delinquencies has been rising.
According to the “Financial Markets Report”
released by the Banking Regulation and Super-
vision Agency (BDDK) in June 2009, 8 percent
of credit card customers hold non-performing
cards and the number of non-performing cards
was above 2 million, a 32 percent increase from
December 2008 and a 107 percent increase from
2006. (Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency, p. 21) The credit card sector accounts
for 19.44 percent of non-performing loans in the
banking sector, and the non-performing loan
ratio of total banking loans was 4.86 percent
as of the second quarter of 2009, its highest level
since March 2006. (Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency, p. 47) In addition, in
August 2009 BDDK warned that it would sus-
pend a bank’s right to issue new credit cards if
the bank’s credit card delinquency rate exceeded
the sector average. This warning came after
credit card delinquency rates reached 10.7
percent in the sector. (“Watchdog Warns . . .”)
One interesting feature of many credit
cards in Turkey that may be contributing to the
problem is the interest-free installment feature.
As of June 2009, credit card purchases made
on an installment basis accounted for 35.1
39
percent of total credit card amounts. (Banking
Regulation and Supervision Agency, p. 46) Cards
featuring the installment option enable card-
holders to make payments on purchases in
interest-free installments to the bank in accor-
dance with the merchant agreement. For exam-
ple, a cardholder may go to a retailer and pay
1,000 TL for merchandise in ten installments.
The cardholder will be billed 100 TL eachmonth
(subject to minimum payment rules), and the
retailer obtains the money from the card-issu-
ing bank in matching installments. In the same
hypothetical example, a cardholder can also
choose to forgo the installment option andmake
a regular credit card purchase, in which the
entire 1,000 TL will be billed to the customer in
the period of purchase. However, while both
options are available, the benefits of the inter-
est-free installment feature are readily apparent.
In essence, the interest-free installment feature
enables the cardholder to realize free money
at the point of purchase, delays the payment
of interest, and lessens the minimum payments
in the first year after purchase.
This credit-card feature is also seen in
other parts of the world; however, the number
of installments offered on purchases in Turkey
far exceeds the number offered in other neigh-
boring areas such as Europe. While the maxi-
mum number of installments in Europe is six,
card issuers and retailers in Turkey can offer up
to 24 installments on certain purchases. (Aysan
and Yildiz, p. 152) Given the high rates of
inflation in Turkey’s past, the installment fea-
ture is very popular and entices customers to
make purchases now when their money is worth
more than it is tomorrow. According to a 2008
MasterCard survey, 90 percent of cardholders in
Turkey use credit cards for the installment
opportunities. (Caglayan)
It seems that this feature in itself is a prob-
lem that increases the financial risk of cardhold-
ers. Purchasing goods on an installment basis
increases the level of debt outstanding over time
and entices customers to make purchases that
they cannot afford. In terms of the maturity dis-
tribution of installment credit card amounts,
17.4 percent of balances mature after six
months. (Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency, p. 46) As Aysan and Yildiz state, “Peo-
ple expend more if their expenditure is made
in installments. As they expend more, the prob-
ability to default increases. As default number
increases, credit cards continue to be a big prob-
lem.” (Aysan and Yildiz, p. 153)
In Turkey there is a heavy reliance placed
on credit cards by Turkish consumers. As a
result of the strict credit conditions imposed by
banks when issuing other types of loans, Turk-
ish consumers increase their spending on
their cards in order to meet their immediate
needs. According to the Interbank Card Cen-
ter, the turnover, or total value, of credit card
transactions increased by 12 percent in Turkey
during the first six months of 2009 compared to
the same period in 2008, indicating a rise in
consumer dependence on plastic. (“Credit
Card Dependency . . .”) Since credit card rates
exceed rates on consumer loans, households are
taking on additional risk. In reference to the
practice, S¸aban Bas¸, chairman of the Adana
Chamber of Commerce (ACC), has stated,
“Turkey is among the countries with the high-
est credit card utilization rates. Especially in
times of crisis, our people tie all their hopes
to their credit cards and try to cover their
momentary cash distress without considering
the outcome.” (“Credit Card Debt . . .”) Conse-
quently, many Turkish cardholders are becom-
ing ensnarled by debt and looking for ways to
avoid the embarrassment of defaulting. As Mark
Landler reported, “Some here even likened it to
the disgrace that drives people to commit the
honor killings that still occur in parts of this
society.” (Landler) Being in debt is a feared
stigma, and to demonstrate this Landler tells
the story of a young woman who struggled to
pay off her father’s credit card debts in order
to remove the shame placed upon her family. In
regard to the future of Turkey and the social
implications regarding debt, Bas¸ has warned,
“Unless some precautions are taken, we should
be ready for some major social explosions.”
(“Credit Card Debt . . .”)
Another Cycle at Play
As stated earlier, Aysan andMuslim describe
a “vicious cycle” that has been occurring in
Turkey, where higher credit card rates lead to
fewer revolvers and more convenience users; in
turn, the higher costs to issuers associated with
convenience users pushes rates even higher.
However, it seems that the effects of the global
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financial crisis, which decreased foreign demand
and led to rising unemployment in Turkey, may
have influenced the dynamics of this cycle.
While I have discussed the two problems
separately, it might be inferred that high and
sticky credit card rates and rising card delin-
quencies in the market are, to a degree, inter-
related. As S¸aban Bas¸ has stated, cardholders
in Turkey tie their hopes of meeting their imme-
diate cash needs to credit cards in times of
economic difficulty. The “Financial Stability
Report” released by the Central Bank of Turkey
has also stated that consumers will increasingly
resort to using credit cards as other forms of
credit in the market become more difficult to
obtain. This evidence suggests that more card-
holders will become revolvers as the Turkish
economy worsens.
Even though banks make their money
off revolvers, they can only do so if revolvers are
able to pay back their debts with accumulated
interest. At the time of this writing, more and
more cardholders in Turkey are defaulting; and,
in turn, defaults put pressure on bank profits in
the credit card market. As a result, it can be
expected that banks will increase rates on cards
in order to compensate for this additional credit
risk.8 The result is that a new kind of cycle
may be occurring, where higher credit card
rates serve as an impetus for more card defaults
and vice versa.
While it was suggested earlier that price
competition might ensue in Turkey as the
market reaches saturation, it is highly unlikely
that this price competition will occur as long as
defaults in the market continue to rise. There-
fore, until stability returns to the overall Turk-
ish economy, it seems that banks will be less
willing to cut prices as their costs of doing busi-
ness rise. These market forces place regula-
tors in a difficult position.
The rising number of card defaults is the
most pressing problem that Turkish regula-
tors need to address. By reducing card defaults,
regulators can help bring stability back to the
market. And if card defaults fall, the market will
become more conducive to price competition,
especially as it reaches saturation. Overall, the
potential key to solving the two problems I have
discussed over the course of this paper is for reg-
ulators to gain control over card delinquencies.
In order to do so, more preventative measures
can be taken to deter cardholders from spend-
ing beyond their means. Much credit-card abuse
stems from a lack of education. Moving forward,
the Turkish government could mandate that
issuers question the financial education of
card applicants and increase cardholder aware-
ness of the burden of debt and the necessity of
appropriate financial planning. This might be
achieved by placing warning labels on credit
cards, asking a series of financial-experience-
related questions on the card application itself,
or requiring that card applicants complete a
financial planning program. Notably, the gov-
ernment could also monitor the installment fea-
ture on credit cards. The installment feature
is an issue that the government has failed to
address and, as discussed, may be exacerbat-
ing the level of card delinquencies. Install-
ment payments increase the level of debt out-
standing over time; and limiting the number
of installments on purchases to levels seen in
other markets could facilitate the reduction of
card defaults by encouraging customers to
spend only what they can afford.
Conclusion
Overall, it is important to appreciate the
Turkish credit card market’s level of sophistica-
tion. The features offered by credit card issuers
in Turkey, including loyalty-point programs, fre-
quent-flier miles agreements, and interest-
free installment plans, mirror the benefits
provided by credit card issuers in Western coun-
tries. At the same time, Turkey’s multi-branded
card network truly integrates convenience with
flexibility; and the levels of growth seen in the
market over the last decade can be attributed to
this sophistication.
Yet despite this sophistication, problems
remain. A new cycle may be influencing the
market where high and sticky credit card rates
cause more credit card defaults, and more
defaults in turn place upward pressure on credit
card interest rate levels. As the saying goes, it is
a lot easier to put on weight than to lose it;
and many Turks are laden with credit-card
debt now more than ever. I do not suggest
that the viability of Turkish banks is at stake
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8This is assuming that rates are not already at the
maximum level as mandated by the Turkish Central Bank.
because of these problems. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the credit card business rep-
resents a sizable portion of non-performing
loans in Turkey. It is vital that regulators gain
control over the growing number of credit card
delinquencies in order to bring stability to the
market and, consequently, establish an indus-
try environment that is conducive to price com-
petition as the market reaches its saturation
point.
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